Chapter 25.00: Chapter iii. — The character of Mr Square the philosopher, and of Mr Thwackum the divine; with a dispute concerning——

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Chapter iii. — The character of Mr Square the philosopher, and of Mr
Thwackum the divine; with a dispute concerning——
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The name of this gentleman, who had then resided some time at Mr
Allworthy's house, was Mr Square. His natural parts were not of the first
rate, but he had greatly improved them by a learned education. He was
deeply read in the antients, and a profest master of all the works of
Plato and Aristotle. Upon which great models he had principally formed
himself; sometimes according with the opinion of the one, and sometimes
with that of the other. In morals he was a profest Platonist, and in
religion he inclined to be an Aristotelian.

But though he had, as we have said, formed his morals on the Platonic
model, yet he perfectly agreed with the opinion of Aristotle, in
considering that great man rather in the quality of a philosopher or a
speculatist, than as a legislator. This sentiment he carried a great way;
indeed, so far, as to regard all virtue as matter of theory only. This, it
is true, he never affirmed, as I have heard, to any one; and yet upon the
least attention to his conduct, I cannot help thinking it was his real
opinion, as it will perfectly reconcile some contradictions which might
otherwise appear in his character.

This gentleman and Mr Thwackum scarce ever met without a disputation; for
their tenets were indeed diametrically opposite to each other. Square held
human nature to be the perfection of all virtue, and that vice was a
deviation from our nature, in the same manner as deformity of body is.
Thwackum, on the contrary, maintained that the human mind, since the fall,
was nothing but a sink of iniquity, till purified and redeemed by grace.
In one point only they agreed, which was, in all their discourses on
morality never to mention the word goodness. The favourite phrase of the
former, was the natural beauty of virtue; that of the latter, was the
divine power of grace. The former measured all actions by the unalterable
rule of right, and the eternal fitness of things; the latter decided all
matters by authority; but in doing this, he always used the scriptures and
their commentators, as the lawyer doth his Coke upon Lyttleton, where the
comment is of equal authority with the text.

After this short introduction, the reader will be pleased to remember,
that the parson had concluded his speech with a triumphant question, to
which he had apprehended no answer; viz., Can any honour exist independent
on religion?

To this Square answered; that it was impossible to discourse
philosophically concerning words, till their meaning was first
established: that there were scarce any two words of a more vague and
uncertain signification, than the two he had mentioned; for that there
were almost as many different opinions concerning honour, as concerning
religion. “But,” says he, “if by honour you mean the
true natural beauty of virtue, I will maintain it may exist independent of
any religion whatever. Nay,” added he, “you yourself will
allow it may exist independent of all but one: so will a Mahometan, a Jew,
and all the maintainers of all the different sects in the world.”

Thwackum replied, this was arguing with the usual malice of all the
enemies to the true Church. He said, he doubted not but that all the
infidels and hereticks in the world would, if they could, confine honour
to their own absurd errors and damnable deceptions; “but honour,”
says he, “is not therefore manifold, because there are many absurd
opinions about it; nor is religion manifold, because there are various
sects and heresies in the world. When I mention religion, I mean the
Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the
Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church
of England. And when I mention honour, I mean that mode of Divine grace
which is not only consistent with, but dependent upon, this religion; and
is consistent with and dependent upon no other. Now to say that the honour
I here mean, and which was, I thought, all the honour I could be supposed
to mean, will uphold, much less dictate an untruth, is to assert an
absurdity too shocking to be conceived.”

“I purposely avoided,” says Square, “drawing a
conclusion which I thought evident from what I have said; but if you
perceived it, I am sure you have not attempted to answer it. However, to
drop the article of religion, I think it is plain, from what you have
said, that we have different ideas of honour; or why do we not agree in
the same terms of its explanation? I have asserted, that true honour and
true virtue are almost synonymous terms, and they are both founded on the
unalterable rule of right, and the eternal fitness of things; to which an
untruth being absolutely repugnant and contrary, it is certain that true
honour cannot support an untruth. In this, therefore, I think we are
agreed; but that this honour can be said to be founded on religion, to
which it is antecedent, if by religion be meant any positive law—”

“I agree,” answered Thwackum, with great warmth, “with a
man who asserts honour to be antecedent to religion! Mr Allworthy, did I
agree—?”

He was proceeding when Mr Allworthy interposed, telling them very coldly,
they had both mistaken his meaning; for that he had said nothing of true
honour. —It is possible, however, he would not have easily quieted
the disputants, who were growing equally warm, had not another matter now
fallen out, which put a final end to the conversation at present.